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I. Introduction
To be formally recognized not only as individuals
but also as a religious community is one of the
main targets of German Muslims which has not yet
been realized. All attempts to achieve a legal 
status equal to the Christian churches have failed
so far. Though, a shift in the debates can be 
observed: whereas in the 1990s the issue of 
juridical recognition in the full sense – as a corpo-
ration of public law which comprises the right to
raise taxes and to provide pastoral care in public
institutions, etc.1 – was at the centre of interest, it
has now become clear that this type of recognition
can only be a long-term goal and that small steps
towards this goal also make sense. It is often
pointed out in this context that for many rights and
activities including religious education at state
schools the status of a corporation of public law is
not a necessity.
Unequal recognition is often quoted as a proof for
discrimination and rejection.2 “Refused recognition”
is a widespread topic of Muslim discourse finally
resulting in a kind of resignation.3 Correspondingly,
the British Muslim activist and social scientist 
Dilwar Hussain has observed that in order to
achieve recognition Muslims in Europe tend to
make much more efforts for representation than for
participation.4 The issue he has raised will serve as
a kind of guideline through this essay. When study-
ing Muslim struggles for recognition, my perspec-
tive is that of a coordinator of Christian-Muslim
dialogue and social ethicist with a Roman Catholic
background, who is interested in social processes
and looks at Islam from a comparative perspective
of mutual learning and searching for ways of 
concerted commitment. 
In the first chapter some philosophical aspects of
recognition will be considered which are then to be
applied to concrete examples. This is followed by a
chapter in which the question “Representation or
Participation?” will be raised in relation to various
fields of Islam in Germany. The conclusion will de-
pict several perspectives and make a comparative
remark on the situation of the churches.
II. Ways of Recognition
As a “vital human need”5 recognition is a central
concept in modern societies, in which identity is no
longer automatically delineated by society and the
individual’s social position, but formed through 
interaction with others.6 This makes evident that
denied recognition (or mis-recognition7) has severe
consequences. Concerning recognition several
types, levels and dimensions can be distinguished:
(1) The first distinction is between individual and
collective recognition.8 In the case of Islam one
often finds a mixture: Individuals want to be recog-
nized for their Muslim identity, but also wish Islam
to be recognized by the state. The following reflec-
tions will be concentrated on collective struggles
for recognition in the public sphere. The collective
entities involved in these struggles are not fixed
and homogeneous, however, as complex belong-
ings of individuals to a variety of entities exist.
Moreover, collective identities always result from
quarrels among conflicting interpretations about
self-definition.9 Therefore, understandably, it is a
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1 Cf. Gerdien Jonker, Muslim Emancipation? Germany’s Struggle over Religious Pluralism, in: Wasif A. R. Shadid/Pieter
Sjoerd van Koningsveld (eds.), Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the 
European Union, Leuven 2002, 36-51, 39s. On the requirements cf. Christian W. Troll, Christian-Muslim Relations in
Germany. A Critical Survey, in: Islamochristiana 29 (2003), 165-202, here 181s.
2 Cf. Nico Landmann, Westeuropa, in: Werner Ende/Udo Steinbach (eds.), Islam in der Gegenwart, München 52005,
560-597, 596: “Neben diesen konkreten Vorteilen hat die öffentlich-rechtliche Anerkennung auch einen symbolischen 
statuserhöhenden Wert – und das Nichtvorhandensein dieser Anerkennung unterstreicht für viele Muslime, dass sie
als Glaubensgemeinschaft nur einen zweitrangigen Wert haben.”
3 Cf. Hans-Joachim Roth, Religiöse Orientierung von Jugendlichen und ihre Bedeutung für den Umgang mit islamischem
Religionsunterricht: Die Fragen des islamischen Religionsunterrichts – Zur Einführung in die Diskussion, Wolf-Dietrich
Bukow/Erol Yildiz (eds.), Islam und Bildung, Opladen 2003, 135-156, 145.
4 Cf. Dilwar Hussain, The Holy Grail of Muslims in Western Europe: Representation and Relationship with the State, in:
John Esposito/François Burgat (eds.), Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East,
London 2003, 215-250, here 245. I shall quote this version, but also refer to a slightly longer unpublished version of
this article which the author kindly made available to me.
5 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and ”The Politics of Recognition,” ed. by Amy Gutmann, Princeton 1992, 26.
6 Cf. ibid., 31 and 36.
7 Ibid., 64.
8 Cf. Barbara Kaletta, Anerkennung oder Abwertung. Über die Verarbeitung sozialer Desintegration, Wiesbaden 2008, 130.
9 Cf. Seyla Benhabib, Kulturelle Vielfalt und demokratische Gleichheit. Politische Partizipation im Zeitalter der Global-
isierung, Frankfurt 1999, 56.
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highly disputed matter which Islam, represented by
whom should be recognized.
(2) The second distinction is between juridical and
social recognition. Likewise Axel Honneth differen-
tiates between juridical recognition and social 
esteem.10 As to Islam in Germany these two 
dimensions cannot always be strictly separated.11
Whereas juridical recognition is very concrete and
defined by laws, social recognition is more flexible
and difficult to measure finding its expression in 
respect, reputation and esteem. Concerning the
recognition of religious communities, the state
formulates certain terms and conditions which
need to be fulfilled. Probably this concreteness is
one of the reasons why juridical recognition is in
the core of the Islam debate in Germany. As to the
relationship of both, social recognition may be a
source of conflict, which can be regulated by a ju-
ridical framework guaranteeing recognition in cer-
tain fields. Whether juridical recognition has been 
accorded or not, can be gauged straightforwardly.
Determining whether social recognition has been
granted is a more difficult case, so that it is worth-
while looking at this field in the following study.
(3) Recognition is a relationship: There is one who
receives recognition and one who grants recogni-
tion. In the case of human rights a relationship of
mutually equal recognition exists. Other issues
may be more one-sided. Thus, it must be pointed
out that to seek for recognition does not come with
a guarantee to receive recognition. Social recogni-
tion may be the result of public debates; then a
(fairly diffuse) public opinion – and not the state –
is source of a kind of collective recognition.12 There
is a certain imbalance when a majority has the
power to grant recognition or to refuse it. The initial
position in the struggle for social recognition is
marked by inequality, as for immigrants with poorer
education access to the public sphere is on aver-
age more difficult. Even if complete equality 
concerning recognition is impossible, there should
be at least equality regarding chances, and 
religious belief should not be hampering recogni-
tion.13 Yet recognition always has to do with differ-
ence. Instead of exerting a “difference-blind”
politics of assimilation, Charles Taylor therefore
proposes a “politics of difference” which recognizes
“the unique identity of this individual or group, their
distinctness from everyone else.”14 It is difficult to
decide, however, if a certain degree of recognition
can be considered as adequate or not.15
(4) There are different strategies to seek for recog-
nition as part of the communication process lead-
ing to recognition, which is not something existing
a priori, but has to be won “through exchange.”16
Representation and participation may be seen as
two such strategies. Both are complex terms. 
Representation, first of all, means drafting a picture
of something, i.e. in this context delineating a 
certain role and concept of Islam. Then, represen-
tation signifies representing others, e.g. as elected
bodies or speakers. Representation relies on 
acceptance of what is articulated in debates so that
there is certain closeness to participation. In many
cases there are disputes about which body may 
legitimately represent whom.17 Participation means
being or becoming a part of something which, by
nature, is always a broader context or issue. It also
indicates a second mode of exertion of democratic
governance: participation through direct
plebiscites, elections or citizens’ groups.18
Dilwar Hussain defines the two concepts as slightly
oppositional: Participation means contributing and
collaborating for the benefit of all, which is a central
element of democracies. Representation, in 
contrast, signifies that individuals or groups act 
according to their status and in favour of their own
interests in a certain social role or political function.
10 Cf. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, Frankfurt 1994, 197. Cf. also
Arto Laitinen, Zum Bedeutungsspektrum des Begriffs Anerkennung: Die Rolle von adäquater Würdigung und Gegen-
seitigkeit, in: Hans Christoph Schmid am Busch/Christopher F. Zurn (eds.), Anerkennung (Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Philosophie, Sonderband 21), Berlin 2009, 301-324; cultural recognition could be discussed as a third field.
11 On legal recognition cf. Mathias Rohe, Der Islam – Alltagskonflikte und Lösungen. Rechtliche Perspektiven, Freiburg
2001, 199-214.
12 Cf. Kaletta, Anerkennung (note 8), 79.
13 Cf. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York 1983, 255s.: ”No simple 
equality of recognition is possible; the idea is a bad joke. […] But if in the struggle for recognition there cannot be
equality of outcomes, there can be […] equality of opportunity.”
14 Taylor, Multiculturalism (note 5), 38; cf. also 43 and 72: ”There must be something midway between the inauthentic and
homogenizing demand for recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self immurement within ethnocentric
standards, on the other.” 
15 Cf. Laitinen, Adäquate Würdigung (note 10), 317.
16 Taylor, Multiculturalism (note 5), 24. Cf. Hans-Joachim Höhn, Kampf um Anerkennung. Muslime, Christen und der
säkulare Rechtsstaat, in: Karl Gabriel/id. (eds.), Religion heute öffentlich und politisch. Provokationen, Kontroversen,
Perspektiven, Paderborn 2008, 140-148, here 145: ”Anerkennung aber muss erworben werden […].”
17 Cf. Werner Schiffauer, Muslimische Organisationen und ihr Anspruch auf Repräsentativität: Dogmatisch bedingte
Konkurrenz und Streit um Institutionalisierung, in: Alexandre Escudier (ed.), Der Islam in Europa. Der Umgang mit dem
Islam in Frankreich und Deutschland, Göttingen 2003, 143-158, here 145s.
18 Cf. Joachim Detjen, Politische Bildung. Geschichte und Gegenwart in Deutschland, München 2007, 302.
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Organisations which represent Muslims and their
interests can be regarded as an example of repre-
sentation.19 The two concepts can be illustrated by
referring to the example of mosques in Germany:
New, visible mosques may be a step towards 
participation of Muslim communities, if they regu-
larly open their doors, cooperate with town coun-
cils, churches and other institutions. Two prominent
examples are the mosques in Mannheim and 
Duisburg which both encompass a centre for 
encounter and dialogue.20 On the other hand, a
well-known argument against building mosques is
that they are exaggerated means of representa-
tion. When no efforts are made to participate, new
mosques nourished suspicion that they are 
primarily means of representation.
With respect to obtaining recognition, Hussain
draws a comparison with the ”Holy Grail.” In his
overview he arrives at the conclusion that the 
Muslims’ strive for recognition has been in vain and
disappointing. He proposes participation as an 
alternative, which means not only struggling for the
own group but: ”making the whole society their
concern rather than just their parochial interests.“21
He regards Muslims’ efforts for representation as
very critical: 
“Muslims have largely attempted to work
with the state, overlooking their opportunity
to also work within the state.“22
An important factor for this is that in many coun-
tries, from which Muslim immigrants to Europe
originate, no full-fledged civil societies exist. 
Considering the two most important countries of
origin with respect to German Muslims it can be 
noticed that these two countries clearly tend toward
representation and formal recognition: In Turkey 
official Islam is even organized by the state and
only recently Muslim groups outside this monopo-
lizing Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet)
have gained a certain amount of freedom. Since
the Austrian occupation in 1878, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina a church-like institutionalized Islam
exists, which now is faced with the challenge that
various Muslim movements have arisen outside
the official Islamic community and that the latter
has to find its place in the emerging civil society.
Even though this does not mandatorily impinge on
the development of Islam in Germany, it is evident
that these traditions will influence it strongly. But as
Hussain’s essay has been published seven years
ago, it must also be asked if there has been some
progress with regard to recognition.
III. Looking at Various Fields of Constructing Islam
Constructing Islam in Germany is a particularly 
exciting issue. To build up new organisations and to
find their place within society was a new issue for
Muslim immigrants. Though mass immigration
started in the early 1960s, until the beginning of the
new millennium and until it was politically accepted
on a broad scale and legally implemented by a new
citizenship law, it looked as if Germany was a
country of immigration and Islam would remain a
permanent phenomenon in the country. Based on
this insight, many milestones have been reached
in the past few years in building up a contextual
German Islam. 
What shall be discussed here is not the individual
level23, but the collective construction of Islam. As
there is no church in Islam which could speak in
the name of all Muslims, the field of articulating
Islam is variegated.24 When introducing Islam in
Germany people look primarily at Muslim associa-
tions as a registered legal form. Even in the context
of this essay this can be an aspect to start with, but
there are many other fields in which Islam is 
constructed.25 All these fields result from interaction
of Islam with social sub-systems such as
public welfare, education, science, other religions
and the media. For the present study fields have
been selected in which certain achievements have
been reached and independent identities of Islam
can be observed. 
It is not claimed that these fields are exhaustive.
Muslim youth and women organisations are further
fields which, however, have been omitted here due
to restricted space. In each of the fields it would be
necessary to intensify the analysis. The intention
is to formulate first hypotheses, depict tendencies
and observations which have to be confirmed by
19 Cf. in favour of this mode according to the French model Dalil Boubakeur, Der interreligiöse Dialog als Faktor des
sozialen Zusammenhalts und als Instrument des Friedens im Mittelmeerraum, in: Peter Graf (ed.), Der Islam im Westen,
der Westen im Islam, Göttingen 2004, 201-209, here 202.
20 Cf. www.institut-mannheim.de and www.ditib-du.de.
21 Hussain, Holy Grail (note 4), 247. On participation cf. Wasif A. R. Shadid/Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld (eds.), 
Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States, Kampen 1996.
22 Hussain, Holy Grail (note 4), 247.
23 Cf. e.g. Sigrid Nökel, Die Töchter der Gastarbeiter und der Islam. Zur Soziologie alltagsweltlicher Anerkennungspoli-
tiken. Eine Fallstudie, Bielefeld 2002; Halit Öztürk, Wege zur Integration. Lebenswelten muslimischer Jugendlicher in
Deutschland, Bielefeld 2007.
24 As an illustration of this, cf. the variety of topics discussed in: Ala Al-Hamarneh/Jörn Thielmann (eds.), Islam and 
Muslims in Germany, Leiden 2008.
25 Cf. e.g. Peter L. Berger/Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, New York 1966.
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further research. One side of the relation will 
be focused on the strategies of recognition. 
Responses of the majority to these strategies are
adumbrated, but not explored in detail.
III.1. Muslim Associations, Building up Um-
brella Organisations and the “Deutsche Islam 
Konferenz”
The formation of Muslim associations in Germany
has been primarily a bottom-up process, which has
resulted in the formation of umbrella organisations
on the national level embracing local associations
with a certain profile all over the country.26 The first 
attempt of creating a preferably single top organisa-
tion comprising several of these organisations was
the “Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland”
(IR) in 1987, founded as a “coordinating institution 
and common decision-making body of Islamic 
religious communities.”27 Its largest member 
organisation is the “Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli
Görü¢” (IGMG) which was inspired by Necmettin 
Erbakan in the beginning and currently comprises
both an Islamist and a reformist-oriented wing. To ob-
tain the status of a corporation of public law is men-
tioned as a main goal in the self-portrayal of the IR:
“The Islamrat seeks for the recognition of
Islam in Germany as a Corporation of 
Public Law and for its equal treatment with
the two large Christian churches and the
Greek-Orthodox church.”28
Thus, representation stands at the centre.
The second top organisation is the “Zentralrat der
Muslime in Deutschland” (ZMD), founded in 1991.
Until 2000, when it left the ZMD, its largest member
organisation was the “Verband der 
Islamischen Kulturzentren” (VIKZ), which is part of
the Turkish Süleymanci movement. Its representa-
tive name – analogous to the “Zentralrat der Juden
in Deutschland” (Central Council of Jews in 
Germany) – helped the ZMD to be heard in public
as one of the most important Muslim voices. Like
the IR, the ZMD claims to be a contact organisation
and central representative body of German 
Muslims: 
“Our most important task is to promote
Muslim life and spirituality in Germany and
to enable the Muslims to practice their 
religion without difficulties.”29
Thus, in contrast to the IR, the self-portrayal of the
ZMD which explicitly wants to support smaller 
associations is focused on issues regarding prayer,
slaughter, religious education and pastoral care. A
central document in German Islam is the “Islamic
Charta,” published in February 2002 by the ZMD.30
Starting by explaining Muslim belief and practice, it
continues with various issues of Muslims living in
Germany. It is interesting that formal recognition is
not mentioned in the document. The text is more
about recognizing the religious practice of Muslims
(§ 20). This indicates that formal representation
corresponds to the institutionalized churches,
whereas recognition for the orthopractical religion
Islam might well look different.
There is one section in the Charta outlining 
participation without using the word itself: 
“The Central Council (ZMD) feels responsi-
ble for society in its entirety. Together with
other social groups it therefore endeavours
to make a significant contribution towards
more tolerance, better ethical behaviour, as
well as an effective protection of the envi-
ronment and of animals. The Central Coun-
cil (ZMD) deplores the violation of human
rights wherever and whenever this occurs.
Thus it is a partner in the fight against reli-
gious discrimination, xenophobia, racism,
sexism, and violence.” (§ 18)
Though this paragraph mentions obligations for the
whole of society, the last article in the Charta 
indirectly recommends to vote according to the
commitment of the candidates to Islam, not to the
general welfare: 
“The Central Council (ZMD) is politically neu-
tral. Muslims entitled to vote will give their
ballot to those candidates who support their
rights and aims most strongly and show the
greatest comprehension of Islam.” (§ 20)
26 As exhaustive introductions to this topic, cf. Thomas Lemmen, Muslime in Deutschland. Eine Herausforderung für
Kirche und Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2001; Ina Wunn et. al., Muslimische Gruppierungen in Deutschland. Ein Hand-
buch, Stuttgart 2007. The issue of Muslim associations on the level of the federal states cannot be addressed here.
Cf. e.g. Hansjörg Schmid/Ay¢e Almıla Akca/Klaus Barwig, Gesellschaft gemeinsam gestalten. Islamische Vereinigungen
als Partner in Baden-Württemberg, Baden-Baden 2008.
27 ”[B]undesweite Koordinierungsinstanz und gemeinsames Beschlußorgan islamischer Religionsgemeinschaften.”
28 ”Der Islamrat strebt Anerkennung als Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts für den Islam in Deutschland und seine
Gleichstellung mit den beiden christlichen Großkirchen und der griechisch-orthodoxen Kirche an.”
www.islamrat.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=54.
29 ”Unsere wichtigste Aufgabe ist es, das muslimische Leben und die islamische Spiritualität in Deutschland zu fördern
und den Muslimen die Ausübung ihrer Religion zu ermöglichen und zu erleichtern.” www.zentralrat.de/2594.php.
30 Cf. www.zentralrat.de/3037.php.
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This may be seen slightly contradictive to § 18 and
its focus on participation, and also as evidence for
an intended dominance of Islam. Therefore, the
overall picture remains inconsistent; it is a mixture
of pro-active participation and representation linked
with Islamic interests.
A further step toward organizing Islam in Germany
was the creation of the “Koordinationsrat der 
Muslime” (KRM) in 2006 as a coordinating roof that
was founded by the four umbrella organisations
ZMD, IR, DITIB (“Türkisch-Islamische Union der
Anstalt für Religion” which is a branch of the 
Turkish Diyanet and constitutes the largest Muslim
consortium in Germany) and VIKZ. According to its
internal rules of procedure, its objectives are
treaties with the state: 
“Together with existing structures on the
level of the federal states and on the local
level, it works to create the legal and organ-
isational requirements for the recognition of
Islam in Germany by state treaties.”31
The KRM may be seen as a tool for representation,
whereas participation happens primarily on the
level of its member associations. Polemical 
demarcations between mosque associations which
belong to different umbrella organisations can
hardly be found any longer. Nonetheless, the KRM
remains weak as it has not been able to develop
beyond an organ of informal consultation.
It becomes evident that Muslim associations on a
national and federal level are mainly oriented 
towards the state. As the prerequisites for formal
juridical recognition are very high in Germany 
(individual membership, organisational structure,
stability and permanency, theological authority, 
loyalty to the constitution) – also for a religious
community, a status which is beneath that of a 
corporation of public law – this might either lead to
resignation or the Muslims will come to terms with
a very tedious process. Concerning the organisa-
tions’ claim on representation, statistical figures
demonstrate how limited this representation is in
reality: According to the latest and most exhaustive
empirical research, only 20% of the German 
Muslims are members of Muslim associations.32
Muslim associations often claim that a membership
covers the entire family and that thus there are far
more adherents than formal members. But recent
empirical results are disillusioning: Only 15.8% of
the German Muslims feel represented by DITIB,
7.2% by the VIKZ. The figures for the umbrella 
organisations are even lower: ZMD 2.7%; IR 2.2%;
KRM 1.9%.33
When the “Deutsche Islam Konferenz” (DIK), 
organized by the Federal Ministry of the Interior,
was initiated in 2006, both sides hoped that it would
lead to a kind of normalisation and would solve
many of the issues in debate. The DIK comprises
15 state representatives and 15 Muslim represen-
tatives. The composition of the Muslim members
brings about a particular challenge, as these 
members are representatives of associations, 
well-known Muslim individuals and critics of Islam.
All members were chosen by the state, not elected.
The following topics have been treated in the DIK
in four plenary sessions and in working groups: 
values as a basis for society, building of mosques,
introduction of Islamic religious education, respon-
sible coverage of Islam in the media and the coop-
eration between the Muslim population and
security agencies. The DIK is intended to be a 
platform for the dialogue between state represen-
tatives and Muslim representatives on a national
level.34 Although not many concrete measures
have been implemented as a result of the DIK, it
marks a paradigm shift for German Muslims: 
Concerning representation they have now acquired
direct access to state representatives on a high
level, and regarding participation they are consid-
ered as necessary dialogue partners by the state.
This is highly appreciated by many observers from
outside:
“The German Islam Conference can be un-
derstood as a contribution to recognize the
Muslims as political players. […] However, it
tends to support the recognition of legiti-
mate political interests on a national level.”35
In spite of this, the DIK has not yet delivered a 
permanent solution to the issue of representation.
31 ”[Er] wirkt gemeinsam mit den bereits bestehenden muslimischen Länderstrukturen sowie den vorhandenen Lokalstruk-
turen an der Schaffung rechtlicher und organisatorischer Voraussetzungen für die Anerkennung des Islams in Deutsch-
land im Rahmen von Staatsverträgen” (www.islam.de/files/misc/krm_go.pdf, § 2). It is remarkable that the KRM does
not yet have its own website.
32 Sonja Haug/Stephanie Müssig/Anja Stichs (eds.), Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland. Im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam
Konferenz, Nürnberg 2009, 167.
33 Ibid., 179.
34 Cf. the documentation: Leila Donner-Üretmek (red.), Drei Jahre Deutsche Islam Konferenz [DIK] 2006-2009, Berlin
2009; and www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1318820/SubSites/DIK/DE/DieDIK/Ausblick/ausblick-
node.html?__nnn=true.
35 ”Die Deutsche Islamkonferenz kann als ein Beitrag zur Anerkennung der Muslime als politische Akteure verstanden 
werden. […] Tendenziell unterstützt sie aber die Anerkennung legitimer politischer Interessen auf Bundesebene.” Dirk
Halm, Der Islam als Diskursfeld. Bilder des Islams in Deutschland, Wiesbaden 2008, 73.
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The links between representation and participation
on the agenda of the DIK seem promising, but
many of the issues discussed remain vague, the
scope of action and implementation being limited.
It must be admitted that Muslim associations are
central figures in the struggle for recognition. Due
to their limited scope and their failure (to a large
extent) to obtain recognition, other fields of 
constructing Islam need to be considered in the 
following. The story of the Muslim umbrella associ-
ations may be seen as a proof that mainly focusing
on representation does not suffice to gain recogni-
tion in German society.
III.2. Social Commitment of Muslims
Due to the often underprivileged situation of 
Muslim immigrants, social work and commitment
constitutes a central field of Muslim activities. In an
overview of social activities of Muslim roof organi-
sations, Thomas Lemmen observes that they
mainly or even exclusively address Muslims, and
that they often care for their members in all areas
of life.36 This observation requires an adequate 
interpretation. As a starting point it has to be 
mentioned that it is very difficult to grasp this field,
since little research has been done here so far.37
A stress of activities lies in the field of education:
The VIKZ runs about 20 hostels for either male or
female pupils. Although some of them take this as
the basis for being trained as an Imam, what is 
actually done in these hostels is social work, not
education of elites. In addition to an Imam, a state
accredited social worker directs each hostel. As
there are usually no all-day schools in Germany,
the hostels prevent young people from spending
their spare time on the street or in front of the com-
puter or television.38 Nevertheless, these hostels
are controversially discussed. Whereas in the 
beginning they were mainly regarded as segrega-
tive (as all leisure activities take place “inside” and
not in mixed sports or music clubs), in some towns
the VIKZ has in the meantime succeeded in dissi-
pating mistrust by opening the doors, cooperating
with state schools and demonstrating the integra-
tive function of its institutions. The Fethullah Gülen
Movement also runs schools or institutions for 
private lessons. Until now, their institutional affilia-
tions and religious motivation have not been very
transparent.39 With decreasing mistrust from 
outside, the religious motivation has been made
more transparent during the last years. The activi-
ties of the Gülen Movement primarily addressed
youths with a migration background and are very
ambitious and professional.40 In both cases the 
activities of Muslims have started to be respected,
but the public and dialogue partners remain 
suspicious about a possible hidden agenda.
One of the most remarkable institutions in this field
is the “Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum
muslimischer Frauen” (Muslim Women’s Centre for
Encounter and Further Education, BFmF) in
Cologne focusing on women and families. It is an
initiative of self-help for encounter, education and
consulting. In their mission statement they mention
equal recognition concerning religion, gender and
race as a goal of Muslims. The situation of the
Muslims is not only considered in terms of religious
recognition but in the wider context of inequality
and discrimination. Recognition is reached by 
participation (“Teilhabe”): 
“Our manifold activities are intended to 
enable women to participate in society on
an equal level while preserving their own
identities.”41
The manifold courses, projects and activities give
proof that this is more than lip service. The high
reputation of the centre and the awards it has 
received indicate that it might be easier to attain
recognition by means of a broad social approach
instead of with a narrow religious approach.
Muslim associations do not yet perform social tasks
coordinated with the state like the churches which
run kindergartens, hospitals and old people’s
homes, etc. Muslim social commitment is still 
rising, but the activities of many mosques resemble
that of welfare centres. This can be seen as a very
pragmatic way towards recognition. Instead of wait-
ing for full juridical recognition it is a way to act.42 As
many projects address the own community and 
36 Cf. Thomas Lemmen, Die Sozialarbeit muslimischer Organisationen in Deutschland, in: Klaus D. Hildemann (ed.), 
Religion – Kirche – Islam. Eine soziale und diakonische Herausforderung, 191-206, 198f.
37 Cf. Peter Heine/Aslam Syed (eds.), Muslimische Philanthropie und bürgerschaftliches Engagement/Muslim 
Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, Berlin 2005.
38 Cf. also the case studies in Schmid/Akca/Barwig, Gesellschaft (note 26), 86-90, 166-169.
39 Cf. ibid., 29s., 129-133; Bekim Agai, Zwischen Netzwerk und Diskurs. Das Bildungsnetzwerk um Fethullah Gülen 
(geb. 1938): Die flexible Umsetzung modernen islamischen Gedankengutes, Schenefeld 2004.
40 Cf. as an example www.bil-privatschule.de.
41 ”Mit unseren breit gefächerten Angeboten möchten wir Frauen und Familien unter Beibehaltung ihrer eigenen Iden-
tität zur gleichberechtigten Teilhabe in der Gesellschaft befähigen.”
www.bfmf-koeln.de/German/index.php?page=articles&op=readArticle&title=Leitbild.
42 This corresponds to the recommendations of Thomas Lemmen/Melanie Miehl, Islamisches Alltagsleben in 
Deutschland, Berlin 2001, 62.
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little publicity is gained, they are not particularly 
visible. There is a broad spectrum of activities so
that it is hardly impossible to detect a common 
tendency. The internal orientation of many of these
projects has many reasons: These associations
have difficulties communicating with actors of the
majority society, making the initiation of cooperation
a tough task.43 Moreover, these are the activities of
an underprivileged minority,44 which – unlike the
powerful and well established churches – is not ca-
pable of becoming active for the society as a whole. 
To sum up, an impressive scope of activities can
be witnessed. Still, there is the danger of pursuing
a parallel commitment which could not be 
described as real participation. What can be found
in this field is often neither representation nor 
participation, but a kind of self-help. This paints a
critical picture of society as a whole, as the task to
build up partnership in this field seems to be often
neglected.
III.3. Islamic Religious Education in State
Schools
Islamic religious education (IRE) is generally 
considered as a central focus of recognition of
Islam.45 In Germany, religious education in state
schools is guaranteed by the constitution. Article 7,
paragraph 3 accords to religious communities the
right to provide the contents of this subject organ-
ized and run by the state (Berlin and Bremen 
constitute formal exceptions). Thus, religious 
education is a field par excellence of cooperation
between the state and religious communities.
There has been a lengthy discussion about the 
introduction of IRE leading to a relatively broad
consensus that IRE should be introduced. The lack
of a definite Muslim organisation being a partner
and contact for the state constitutes the main 
obstacle. Nevertheless with more pragmatic
arrangements IRE has started in seven federal
states as a model project in selected schools in
2003. IRE creates its own organisations, provision-
ally replacing a broad Muslim representation: a
round table with representatives of several Muslim
associations such as in Lower Saxony, or local 
parent associations like in Bavaria.
In many respects, IRE approximates the logic of
participation to a larger degree: Islam becomes
part of school education; Islam has to correspond
to the framework of curricula and school authori-
ties; teachers of IRE participate in many discus-
sions with their colleagues. Although these
teachers are regarded as representatives of Islam
by their colleagues, students or parents, their 
affiliation is usually looser than that of representa-
tives of associations. Moreover, teacher training
takes place at state universities where IRE 
becomes a subject like others. Hence, IRE illus-
trates that Islam forms an integral part of society.
It would be possible to discuss IRE on the basis of
curriculum or a monitoring of lessons.46 In this
case, the exemplary look at the first school book is
taken as an access. This book has the title “Saphir”
(meaning “jewel” or “sapphire”). The first volume is
intended for the fifth and sixth grades. Already in
the third chapter with the title “To Be God’s 
Creation” there is a double page on responsibility
as a marker of identity for human beings (“Mensch
sein heißt, Verantwortung zu übernehmen”). The
constitution and Islam are compatible: 
“All human beings have rights and duties
and bear responsibility together – inde-
pendent of their religion.”47
Human dignity and life are also considered values
in Islam. Later in the book there is another 
comparison of the Treaty of Medina and the imple-
mentation of the German constitution.48 Justice and
pluralism are a recurrent theme throughout the
whole book. Interestingly, the glossary at the end of
the book contains, besides many religious terms,
the entry “Grundgesetz,” meaning the German
constitution, which is mentioned in several 
chapters of the book.49 Thus loyalty to the state and
its constitution can be seen as an implicit goal of
“Saphir.”
The IGMG published an anonymous and very 
critical “review” of “Saphir” on its website.50 It 
accused the authors of mixing a theological and 
religious study approach and thereby presenting a
watered down Islam. In his response in the
43 Cf. Schmid/Akca/Barwig, Gesellschaft (note 26), 258s.
44 Cf. Tarek Badawia, ”Ana laha.” ”Ich nehme es selbst in die Hand” – Muslimische Jugendliche und ein islamischer 
Bildungsauftrag, für den sich sonst keiner zuständig fühlt, in: Bukow/Yildiz, Islam und Bildung (note 3), 115-134. 
45 Cf. Mouhanad Khorchide, Der islamische Religionsunterricht zwischen Integration und Parallelgesellschaft: Einstel-
lungen der islamischen ReligionslehrerInnen an öffentlichen Schulen, Wiesbaden 2009, 57s. Cf. as introductions to the
topic: Hansjörg Schmid, Wie der islamische Religionsunterricht die Gesellschaft verändert, in: Katechetische Blätter 135
(2010), 136-141.
46 Cf. Irka-Christin Mohr/Michael Kiefer (eds.), Islamunterricht – Islamischer Religionsunterricht – Islamkunde. Viele Titel
– ein Fach?, Bielefeld 2009.
47 ”Alle Menschen haben Rechte und Pflichten, sie tragen gemeinsam Verantwortung – unabhängig von ihrer Religion.”
Lamya Kaddor et. al. [eds.], Saphir 5/6. Religionsbuch für junge Musliminnen und Muslime, München 2008, 37.
48 Cf. ibid., 85.
49 Cf. ibid., 185s.
50 Cf. ”Stellungnahme der IGMG zum Religionsbuch Saphir 5/6,” in: 
www.igmg.de/verband/presseerklaerungen/artikel/2009/05/20/9824.html?L=.html.
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“Zeitschrift für Religionslehre des Islam” (ZRLI),
which is the first journal in German for teaching
Islam, Harry Harun Behr, professor for Islamic 
religious pedagogy in Erlangen-Nuremberg and
one of the editors of “Saphir,” stresses the Muslims’
solidarity with all human beings: 
“According to my view, Islam is more about
issues concerning all of us than about 
issues concerning us exclusively as 
Muslims.”51
Humanism as a target of Islam stands in the core
of Behr’s Islamic religious pedagogy. According to
needs of schools and young people, IRE stresses
the plurality of identities which are like permanent
construction sites,52 and an individualized under-
standing of Islam. Thus, it is not very surprising that
conflicts with Islamic associations that are the
agents of collective Muslim identities arise. The 
situation of the individual, instead of common 
interests of Muslims, stands in the foreground.
To sum up, IRE with regards to contents and 
structures clearly follows the logic of participation.
It will be interesting to observe further which results
this teaching will achieve on other fields of Islam in
the future.
III.4. Islamic Theology at Universities
Islamic theology at German universities is a rela-
tively young phenomenon and started six years
ago. Until now the majority of the imams are
trained at foreign schools or universities. At the 
moment there are two chairs at Münster, two at 
Osnabrück, two at Frankfurt (soon there will be a
third one) and one at Erlangen-Nuremberg.53 Their
task is to train teachers for IRE, Muslim theolo-
gians, in the future also imams.54 They have no 
ordinary legitimization from a Muslim community,
but somehow Muslim associations have been 
consulted in all cases. The holders of the seven
chairs have been invited for many lectures and
have become quite famous faces of German
Islam. Besides their research they all reflect on
how Islamic theology can be build up in Germany
and which steps would be necessary in order to
gain recognition as Muslims. Harry Harun Behr 
describes Islamic theology in the German context
as “discourse- and process-related by providing
help in situations of social and political change.”55
This theology is, according to Behr, highly 
situational, as it arises from and aims at the 
concrete situation, what leads to an inner-Muslim
plurality.56
Muhammad Kalisch who has held the first chair at
the University of Münster since 2004 published a
widely received statement about the Danish
Muhammad caricatures. He stipulates self-criticism
and a process of learning on both sides. Absolute
freedom is paramount, even when religious 
sentiment is violated: 
“In the conflict between freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of science on the one
hand and religion on the other hand there
must be an absolute freedom of opinion and
science, even if this might violate religious
sentiment.”57
This means participation of Muslims in debates
without any restrictions because of religion. Mean-
while, a conflict between Kalisch and Muslim 
associations arouse as Kalisch himself called upon
this freedom postulating that Muhammad might not
have existed.58 With this statement, according to
many Muslims, he exceeded the framework of
Islam so that he was no longer accepted as some-
one legitimated to train future teachers of Islam.
Bülent Ucar from Osnabrück University stated that
Muslims have been rejected or regarded as aliens
in society. According to Ucar, the formation of elites
51 ”Der Islam teilt uns nach meinem Dafürhalten mehr über Dinge mit, die uns alle gemeinsam betreffen, und weniger über
Dinge, die uns exklusiv als Muslime betreffen.” Harry Harun Behr, Ein Saphir mit Schliff. Zur Stellungnahme der 
islamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görü¢ e.V. [IGMG] gegen das Schulbuch Saphir, in: ZRLI 3 [2009] nr. 5, 2–25, here 7.
52 Cf. Harry Harun Behr et al. (eds.), Was soll ich hier? Lebensweltorientierung muslimischer Schülerinnen und Schüler
als Herausforderung für den Islamischen Religionsunterricht, Berlin 2010.
53 Cf. the introductions to some of these courses of study in: Wolfram Weiße (ed.), Theologie im Plural. Eine akademische
Herausforderung, Münster 2009.
54 Cf. Rauf Ceylan, Die Prediger des Islam. Imame – wer sie sind und was sie wirklich wollen, Freiburg 2010. Ceylan has
been professor at the University of Osnabrück since summer 2009.
55 ”(D)iskursiv und prozessual, indem sie Hilfestellung in gesellschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Umbruchsituationen
leistet.” Harry Harun Behr, Ein ordentliches Fach? Neue Wegmarken für den Islamischen Religionsunterricht, in: Herder
Korrespondenz 61 [2007], 298-303, here 303.
56 Harry Harun Behr, Grundriss islamisch-theologischen Denkens im Kontext der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: ZRLI
1 (2007), H. 1, 2-9, here 4.
57 ”Im Spannungsfeld von Meinungsfreiheit und Wissenschaftsfreiheit einerseits und Religion andererseits muss es eine
absolute Freiheit der Meinung und der Wissenschaft geben, auch wenn dies religiöse Gefühle verletzen mag.” Muham-
mad Kalisch, Stellungnahme zum gegenwärtigen Konflikt um Karikaturen, die den Propheten Muhammad abbilden, in:
www.compass-infodienst.de/Muhammad_Kalisch__Stellungnahme_zum_Konflikt_um_die_Mohammed-
Karrikaturen.5852.0.html.
58 Cf. on the case Peter Philipp, Doubt about Muhammad’s Existence Poses Threat to Islamic Religious Education
(18.9.2008), in: www.en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-812/i.html.
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is therefore necessary for Muslims, which is one of
the tasks of the chairs.59 In a recent article Ucar
claims that Islamic theology can be critical and 
dialogue-oriented, but needs to be authentic in
order to be accepted by Muslims:
“In the long run, this recognition and legal
equal treatment serves as a basis for 
participation and integration.”60
According to Ucar, this means that recognition and
equal ranking of Islam will be necessary. Before
this has been achieved, participation and integra-
tion may take place in more informal ways.
Ömer Özsoy, whose chair at Frankfurt University
has been donated by the Turkish Diyanet, states
that acceptance and internalization of democratic
and pluralistic values are necessary for Muslims.
He sees it as a task for Islamic theology to 
contribute to this process.61 His colleague Abdullah
Takim stresses the need of a scientific articulation
and public comments on important topics by 
German Muslims: 
“In my view, the Muslims in Germany have
to articulate on a scientific level and to work
out positions on important topics (both 
social and theological) in order to make
themselves be understood and to contribute
to the community, for Islam has meanwhile
become an integral part of Germany.”62
Both in Osnabrück and in Frankfurt the chairs have
organized interdisciplinary congresses.63 Repre-
sentatives of different scientific disciplines
contributed to these congresses and also had a
look on Islam from outside. Thus Islamic theology
is on the point of becoming a discipline in the 
concert of sciences at German universities.64 The
professors for Islamic theology in Germany are
highly independent and not in the service of any
associations (also in Frankfurt). They critically 
reconstruct Islam stressing historical change and
the ability to adapt. Thus they have acquired a high
degree of respect. In the 1990s the representatives
of the associations functioned as main public
spokespersons of Islam in the media and confer-
ences, while nowadays these professors as
learned experts are often preferred. They are 
participating in the scientific discourses and are 
arguing for participative forms of Islam. Although
their juridical legitimization within the Muslim 
communities is not always clear, they are affecting
recognition. Their chance will be to form Islam on a
broad scale in the future by training imams, 
theologians and teachers.
III.5. Inter-Religious Dialogue between Muslims
and Christians
In this field some empirical research has started
which can serve as a basis for analysis.65 Chris-
tian-Muslim dialogue takes place on many levels
and in numerous projects. Concerning recognition
this field breaks ranks, for at least in ideal cases
Muslims and Christians act together and produce
common identities. If this is not yet the case, at any
rate equal social recognition may be acquired
within the course or context of dialogue. Dialogue
also has strong consequences on the participants
and their communities of origin. It is one field which
has helped Muslims to be present in the public
sphere and to articulate their concerns. As Muslims
59 Cf. Bülent Ucar, Wie bringen die Religionen ihre ethische Botschaft in die gesellschaftliche Diskussion ein? Ein Beitrag
aus muslimischer Sicht, in: Hansjörg Schmid et al. (eds.), Verantwortung für das Leben. Ethik in Christentum und Islam,
Regensburg 2008, 229-248, 244.
60 ”Diese Anerkennung und rechtliche Gleichstellung bietet langfristig die Basis für Partizipation und Integration.” Bülent
Ucar, Islamische Theologie in Deutschland? Die Ausbildung von Religionslehrern und Theologen an staatlichen
Hochschulen, in: Die Unbekannte Religion. Muslims in Deutschland (Herder Korrespondenz Spezial 2/2009), 31-35,
here 32.
61 Donner-Üretmek (red.), Drei Jahre (note 34), 277ss.
62 ”Meines Erachtens müssen sich die Muslime in Deutschland […] wissenschaftlich artikulieren und zu wichtigen
gesellschaftlich-theologischen Themen eine Position erarbeiten, um sich verständlich zu machen und zum Zusam-
menleben beizutragen, denn der Islam ist mittlerweile Teil Deutschlands geworden.” 
www.akademie-rs.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf_archive/schmid/2008_03_03_Takim_Antwort_Bischof.pdf, here 2.
63 www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb09/islam/forschung/symposien/index.html, respectively www.islamische-religionspaeda-
gogik.uni-osnabrueck.de/973.htm.
64 Cf. Ertugrul Sahin, Der schwierige Weg zur Einbürgerung des Islam. Plädoyer für eine islamische Theologie an
deutschen Universitäten, in: Forschung Frankfurt 2008/1, 81-85 (also in: www.forschung-frankfurt.
uni-frankfurt.de/dok/2008/2008-01/Der_schwierige_Weg.pdf). Sahin describes Islamic theology at state universities as
a necessary milestone in order to naturalize Islam in Germany (85).
65 Cf. Eva Maria Hinterhuber, Abrahamischer Trialog und Zivilgesellschaft. Eine Untersuchung zum sozialintegrativen
Potenzial des Dialogs zwischen Juden, Christen und Muslimen, Stuttgart 2009; Gritt Klinkhammer/Ayla Satilmis, 
Kriterien und Standards der interreligiösen und interkulturellen Kommunikation – Eine Evaluation des Dialogs mit dem
Islam. Projektabschlussbericht, Bremen 2007; Hansjörg Schmid, Zwischen Asymmetrie und Augenhöhe. Zum Stand
des christlich-islamischen Dialogs in Deutschland, in: Peter Hünseler/Salvatore Di Noia (eds.), Kirche und Islam im 
Dialog. Eine europäische Perspektive, Regensburg 2010, 49-89. Cf. also Friedmann Eißler, Christian-Muslim Encounter
– Recent Issues and Perspectives, in: Al-Hamarneh/Thielmann, Islam (note 24), 161-182.
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and Christians are not yet in an equal position,
Christians often act as advocates supporting 
Muslim needs and interests.66
A continuing difference of interests can be 
witnessed in several dialogues and over the course
of many years. Church interlocutors predominantly
want a dialogue on theological issues, whereas
Muslims usually prefer a “concrete dialogue” that
is orientated towards action and criticize a merely
verbal exchange without any measurable results.67
Muslims want to be recognized and get access to
social resources by means of the dialogue,
whereas Christians want to acquaint themselves
with the religion perceived as foreign, so that they
often take up the role of the inquirer and the 
Muslims, consequently, are pressed into the role of
the respondents. Some Christian participants of 
dialogue observe that Muslims have started to 
retire from dialogue as they now have a direct 
access to the government (via the “Deutsche Islam
Konferenz,” for example). But this only applies to
representatives of associations, not to those who
work with one of the numerous grass-roots 
organisations. 
Since the 1980s, Muslims have founded special
associations for dialogue often named “Christlich-
Islamische Gesellschaft” (CIG) in several cities and
regions. In analogy to the formation of Muslim 
umbrella organisations, in 2003 an umbrella 
organisation of now 17 local dialogue organisations
was founded, the “Koordinierungsrat des christlich-
islamischen Dialogs” (KCID). The organisation has
intended to create structures for acquiring financial
support and to build up a lobby for inter-religious
dialogue. Further aims are networking, common
activities, commitment for peaceful coexistence
and comments, when issues of a fair media cover-
age and religious freedom are touched.68 The KCID
is a sort of agency of representation, but as it is
based on organisations with local activities, it can
be considered as a balanced mutual complement
to representation and participation.
If it is more for the sake of representation or 
participation, it depends on who is active in 
dialogue and in which context. Spokespersons of
Muslim associations usually follow their strategy of
representation in dialogues like in any other 
context. But generally inter-religious dialogue can
be seen as a means of participation. Participation
can be both a topic and a target of dialogue. Like
typically in the religious field, dialogue initiatives
often comprise all social classes so that dialogue
has a particular relevance for participation.69
Dialogue creates networks and new institutions in
which people with different religious affiliations act
together in civil society. This breaks open limits of
the religious communities and identities. This does
not only have a symbolical meaning, but these 
entities may act as a mediator in the case of crises.
Dialogue shows both communalities and 
differences and is also a procedure to deal with
these differences by integrating them into a
broader picture. Furthermore, dialogue eliminates
prejudices and contributes to get to know the other.
Images of the self and the other are brought into a
dialogue. In dialogue, one experiences the inner
plurality of the religions. Finally, experiences of 
discrimination and victimization can be broken up
in dialogue.
To sum up, the relevance of inter-religious dialogue
for recognition is high. Dialogue anticipates social
recognition in a microcosm which ideally will 
emanate on the society as a whole.
III.6. Muslim Articulation in the Media
In addition to the fields treated so far, the field of
media cannot be neglected. What is considered as
essential here are articulations in German 
language addressed not only to Muslims but also
to the whole society. The field can be divided into
three categories: 
First, journalists with a Muslim background writing
for mainstream media: The most prominent figure
in this category is Navid Kermani.70 As this area is
very varied and difficult to grasp, it will not be 
discussed here in more detail. 
Second, “Muslim media”: This is a field marked by
less participation, but it can be seen in analogy with
newspapers like the weekly “Jüdische Allgemeine,”
edited by the “Zentralrat der Juden in Deutsch-
land,” or the weekly “Rheinischer Merkur” held by
the German Bishops’ Conference and several 
dioceses. In this context the monthly “Islamische
Zeitung” has to be mentioned:71 It contains articles
by a variety of authors on diverse topics – all in
German language. The circulation figure is not
known, it is not yet very professional and not
66 Cf. Hansjörg Schmid, Anwälte, Vermittler oder Partner? Zur sozialen Rolle kirchlicher Akteure im christlich-islamischen
Dialog, in: Peter Hünseler (ed.), Im Dienst der Versöhnung. Für einen authentischen Dialog zwischen Christen und 
Muslimen (Festschrift für Christian W. Troll), Regensburg 2008, 115-145.
67 Hansjörg Schmid, Concrete Dialogue. About What Muslims Talk with Christians in Germany, 
www.con-spiration.de/texte/english/2008/schmid2-e.html, 472.
68 Cf. www.kcid.de/kcid/satzung.php.
69 Cf. Hinterhuber, Trialog (note 65), 187.
70 Cf. www.navidkermani.de/view.php?nid=0&switch_lid=2 and his most recent monography: Wer sind wir? München
2009. Cf. Sabine Schiffer, Islam in German Media, in: Al-Hamarneh/Thielmann, Islam (note 24), 423-440.
71 Cf. www.islamische-zeitung.de.
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quoted in press reviews. Despite its partly 
missionary intention72 and some critical points 
concerning the ideological background,73 it 
contributes many current political and economic
debates. There is a column, “Muslime & Global-
isierung,” with pro and con articles on issues of
economy and sustainable development. Besides
general issues, the concerns of Muslims are at the
centre of the newspaper. It features regular reports
on activities of Muslims and Muslim associations in
various parts of Germany and abroad. Reports on
new mosques are quite frequent in the column
“Muslime & Lebensart,” German for Muslims and
way of life. However, in the regular interviews
roughly half of the interviewees are non-Muslims.
An example for Muslim concerns is a recent 
leading article on the new German Minister of the
Interior, Thomas de Maizière.74 Although half of the
article is about how he might continue the
“Deutsche Islam Konferenz,” it is well-balanced. An-
other issue regularly picked up is how the 
German majority perceives Muslims. While one 
article paints a dark picture, calls the term Islamism
“a merciless measure of sanction and 
exclusion”75, but claims at the same time that 
approaching the majority is essential,76 another 
article after the murder of Marwa El-Sherbini in a
Dresden court in July 2009 is cautious and states
that despite a growing anti-Muslim sentiment, 
Germans are not hostile to Islam in general.77 Thus,
the “Islamische Zeitung” can be described as a mix-
ture of lobby institution and an attempt to participate
in public debate. Articles on political issues, elections,
etc. make evident that as far as the “Islamische
Zeitung” is concerned, participation does not render
the Muslim motivation invisible. On the contrary, it is
a way to be publicly present as Muslims. However, to
broaden these observations a more lengthy analysis
of the journal would be necessary. Third, special proj-
ects comparable to proclamation broadcasting 
in public media, for which Muslims do not yet 
have a right due to the lack of formal 
recognition: There is one project run by the 
Südwestrundfunk (SWR) called “Das Islamische
Wort – Muslimische Glaubensbeiträge” (The 
Muslim Word – Contributions of Muslim Faith), which
can be heard and read on the internet and which will
be presented here as an example.78 It 
addresses both Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Although the broadcasting contains witness of faith,
it is under the main responsibility of the 
editorial staff. Whereas the project was disputed in
the beginning, meanwhile it has found a broad 
acceptance and is considered an important contribu-
tion to integration. Two authors are important 
figures in Muslim associations, whereas the other
two are Muslim intellectuals. Among the themes
broadcasted so far are theological, spiritual and 
ethical issues.79 One of the contributions stresses
that Muslims should struggle for the whole of 
humanity before speaking of Muslim solidarity. 
Furthermore, the author observes that it is still 
difficult to imagine Muslims criticize the federal 
government in general political issues like the
churches do.80 In line with this, another text states
that education and learning should not aim at 
increasing wealth, power and respect, but 
contribute to the “peaceful progress of all 
people.”81 Similarly, other contributions look at 
economic issues namely protection of the environ-
ment from a perspective which is partly 
general and partly shared by Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam.82 Concerning racism, a topic which was
treated in the face of the murder of the 
Muslim Marwa El-Sherbini in Dresden, the 
perspective may be described as that of universal
fraternity so that Muslims should not only show pity
when Muslims are attacked but also resist all kinds
of Anti-Semitism and racism.83 Finally it is stated
that the Qur’an contains “fundamental and 
universal values” and that Muslims and non-Mus-
lims should participate in the “collective struggle for
a prosperous and peaceful living together.”84
72 In many editions there is an advertisement ”Wie kann man deutsche Muslime kennenlernen?” (How to get to know Ger-
man Muslims [which means here converts to Islam, H.S]), e.g., nr. 167, 4; nr. 171, 4, etc.
73 Cf. Hansjörg Schmid, Ein schwieriges Verhältnis. Muslime und Öffentlichkeit in Deutschland, in: Herder Korrespondenz
60 (2006), 75-79, here 78.
74 Cf. Khalil Breuer, Der leise Schäuble. Der neue Innenminister wirkt sachlich und kompetent – aber wie geht die 
Islamkonferenz weiter?, in: Islamische Zeitung nr. 176, February 2010, 1.
75 “gnadenlos wirksame Sanktions- und Ausgrenzungsmaßnahme”
76 Cf. Malik Özkan, Geht es um den Islam? Islamgegner organisieren Mehrheiten gegen Muslime, in: Islamische Zeitung
nr. 175, January 2010, 1 and 10.
77 Cf. Sulaiman Wilms, ”Deutschland ist nicht islamfeindlich.” Auch die deutschen Muslime sollten nicht von einem
Einzelfall auf das Ganze schließen, in: Islamische Zeitung nr. 170, August 2009, 1.
78 There is also the ”Forum am Freitag” by the ZDF which is less focused on religion: www.forumamfreitag.zdf.de.
79 Cf. www.swr.de/islamisches-wort, and the overview with links to all texts www.islam.de/9442.php; cf. also Reinhard
Baumgarten (red.), Das Islamische Wort – Muslimische Glaubensbeiträge im SWR, Stuttgart 2009.
80 Hilal Sezgin, Der „selbstverständliche“ Islam, in: ibid., 77-79, here 79.
81 Emina Corbo-Mesic, Islam und Bildung, in: ibid., 28-30, here 30.
82 Aiman Mazyek, Schattenreiche Zinswirtschaft, in: ibid., 86-89, here 88; Emina Corbo-Mesic, Des Schöpfers Geschöpfe
und seine Schöpfung (October 2009), www.islam.de/9442.php.
83 Aiman Mazyek, Rassismus tötet (August 2009), www.islam.de/9442.php.
84 Bekir Alboga, Islamische Werte und das Grundgesetz, in: Baumgarten, Das Islamische Wort (note 79), 94-96, here 95
respectively 96.
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The Islam of the “Islamische Wort” is not an Islam
struggling for representation, but an Islam which
considers itself being an ethical resource for the
whole society. Even when broaching the issue of
islamophobia, this is not done primarily from the
perspective of victims, but from a pro-active one.85
Only one out of 34 texts published so far is about
the claim for equal treatment and recognition – but
this text, in the end, pleads not to limit the political
perspective on religion: 
„Many other things, however, Muslims do not
need as Muslims but merely as humans.“86
The examples of the “Islamische Zeitung” and the
“Islamische Wort” illustrate that the framework
strongly affects the picture of Islam: on the one
hand a journal built up and run by Muslims, on the
other hand a programme of a public broadcasting
company. Thus non-Muslim institutions can also
contribute to a participative Islam.
IV. Conclusion: A Direct Road to the Arena of Civil
Society?
It is not the aim of this essay to judge which of the
six presented fields is the most important – they
are all relevant. Sometimes they stand side by
side, indifferent and complementary, sometimes
they reinforce one another, at other times they are
in tension or even in conflict. E.g. the Islam of IRE
is quite different from the one of the Islamic asso-
ciations. Thus the fields imposingly illustrate that in
Germany a rich plurality of Islam has grown in the
last decade. One can speak of a contextual Ger-
man Islam, for which the articulation in the German
language has become self-evident. Due to the or-
ganisational grade and structure it is difficult to de-
cide who represents the German Muslims. This
strongly limits the scope of representation. Never-
theless recognition takes place through both strate-
gies. In many cases representation and
participation are overlapping and inseparable from
each other. Representation needs participation and
vice versa. Like a political scientist stated: 
“Without representation there is no partici-
pation […].”87
The examples show that a certain degree of repre-
sentation is necessary. But also a growing ten-
dency towards participation can be observed.
Recognition is in any case a result of communica-
tion and interaction. As there is certain mistrust to-
wards the Islamic associations and their ambition
for representation, the path of participation – such
as proposed by Dilwar Hussain – may be more
promising. The political and social role of religious
communities in Germany not only results from their
legal status. Moreover, recognition is not primarily
accorded on the top level, but in many places
grows from the bottom up.
The imitation of the established Christian churches
may be misleading for German Muslims. As José
Casanova demonstrated, there is a shift for reli-
gious activists from the arenas of the state and of
political society to that of civil society.88 Among
Christian theologians it has been disputed, if the
churches with their divine origin and long tradition
should be seen as agents of civil society.89 For the
churches looking back on a long history of a close
relation with the state it is not always easy to render
power and to share former privileges. They still
have to complete the step from “state-oriented” to
“society-oriented” institutions.90 For Muslims with
their loose structure of associations and their inter-
nal pluralism this step might be easier than for the
churches: 
“Conceptually however Muslim political dis-
course has lost this emphasis, simply refer-
ring to the ‘individual’ and the ‘state’, largely
neglecting notions of civil society. The em-
phasis in Muslim political thought now
should be on reviving and maintaining the
independence of civil society […].”91
To be part of civil society means sharing and
convincing with arguments instead of relying on
monopolies and privileges. Therefore alliances
with other social entities may occur. Contributing
to the civil society also strengthens social cohe-
sion and democracy. The doors of civil society
are open for German Muslims and there is no
need to wait for decades to achieve a certain
legal status.92
85 Aiman Mazyek, Morgenland im Abendland (December 2009), www.islam.de/9442.php, which was written due to the
Swiss referendum banning the construction of minarets.
86 “Vieles weitere allerdings brauchen Muslime gar nicht als Muslime, sondern schlicht als Menschen.” (Hilal Sezgin,
Muslime und Macht, September 2009), www.islam.de/9442.php.
87 ”Ohne Repräsentation gibt es keine Partizipation […].” Volker Gerhardt, Partizipation. Das Prinzip der Politik, München
2007, 25.
88 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago 1994, 61-63, 218s.
89 Cf. Frank Adloff, Zivilgesellschaft. Theorie und politische Praxis, Frankfurt/New York 2005, 119. Cf. also Dilwar 
Hussain, Islam and Civil Society in the UK, in: www.euro-muslims.eu/en/menu-vertical/emn-members-
articles/detail/news/islam-and-civil-society-in-the-uk/.
90 Cf. Casanova, Public Religions (note 88), 220.
91 Yasir Suleiman et al., Contextualizing Islam in Britain: Exploratory Perspectives, Cambridge 2009, 38 (available on
www.cis.cam.ac.uk/CIBPReportWeb.pdf).
92 A lack of financial and organisational resources can limit the activities in the civil society. This might be another 
argument to go further.
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